The Distribution of Bolivia’s Most Important Natural Resources and the Autonomy Conflicts by Mark Weisbrot & Luis Sandoval
Issue Brief • July 2008 
 
Center for Economic and 
Policy Research 
1611 Connecticut Ave, NW 
Suite 400 




The Distribution of Bolivia’s Most 
Important Natural Resources and the 
Autonomy Conflicts 
 
BY MARK WEISBROT AND LUIS SANDOVAL* 
 
Over  the  last  year,  there  has  been  an  escalation  in  the  political  battles  between  the 
government of President Evo Morales and a conservative opposition, based primarily in 
the prefectures, or provinces. The opposition groups have rallied around various issues 
but have recently begun to focus on "autonomy."  Some of the details of this autonomy 
are  legally  complex  and  ambiguous,  and  they  vary  among  the  provinces  whose 
governments are demanding autonomy. Since May of this year, four prefectures – Santa 
Cruz, Beni, Pando, and Tarija, which are often referred to as the "Media Luna"1 – have 
held referenda, which were ruled illegal by the national judiciary,2 in which a majority of 
those voting voted in favor of autonomy statutes. 
 
While there are a number of political and ideological aspects to this conflict, this paper 
focuses on one of the most important underlying sources of the dispute: the distribution 
of  Bolivia's  most  important  natural  resources.  For  reasons described below, these are 
arable land and hydrocarbons.  
 
This paper shows that the ownership and distribution of these key resources are at the 
center of the current conflict. Furthermore, it appears that reform of this ownership and 
distribution may be necessary for the government to deliver on its political promise to 
improve  the  living  standards  of  the  country's  poor  majority,  who  are  also 
disproportionately indigenous. According to the most recent data, Bolivia has a poverty 
rate  of  60  percent.  The  number  of  people  in  extreme  poverty  is  about  38  percent 
(UDAPE, 2008). Extreme poverty means not having regular access to basic needs for 
survival: for example, about 28 percent do not have drinkable water, and about 24 percent 
of children under 3 years old are malnourished. Poverty is much more concentrated in 
rural areas, where it averages 76.5 percent (World Bank, 2005).  
 
With 39.5 percent of the labor force employed in agriculture (UDAPE, 2008), it seems 
clear  that  land  redistribution  is  not  only  one  of  the  most  important  demands  to  the 
electorate that voted for the current government, but also an important means by which 
to  address  the problems of rural development and poverty. Furthermore, the national 
government was elected on a program of getting control over the country's hydrocarbon 
revenue  and  using  that  revenue  for  poverty  alleviation  and  development.  This 
commitment may also be difficult or impossible to fulfill without the central government 
having sufficient control over these key resources and revenues. 
* Mark Weisbrot is Co-Director and Luis Sandoval is a Research Assistant at the Center for Economic and Policy Research in 
Washington, DC. The authors would like to thank Dan Beeton and Doug Hertzler for helpful comments.
                                                 
1 The “Media Luna”, or Half-Moon, refers to the shape of these four provinces in carving out a half-moon of the eastern part 
of the national territory. 
2 Corte Nacional Electoral, República de Bolivia (2008), "Resoluciones de la Corte Nacional Electoral." Resolución Nº 
014/2008, Cochabamba. Found at 28 July 2008. 
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Land Tenure in Bolivia 
Data  on  land  tenure  (e.g.  number and size of landholdings by department) in Bolivia are not recent. The last 
comprehensive agricultural census, for example, was carried out in 1984.3  However, although there have been 
significant changes over the last two decades, it is unlikely that the distribution has become much more equal. For 
example,  in  1953  there  was  a  Land  Reform  decree.  There  was  significant  redistribution  of  land  from  large 
landholders to indigenous peasants in the beginning, but around the late 60s and 70s and then again in the 1990s, 
vast amounts of land were given to a smaller group of individuals in the eastern part of the country, accompanied by 
corruption.  
 
According to the First National Agricultural Census in 1950, 4 percent of all agricultural units controlled more than 
82 percent of surveyed land surface (Morales et al, 2000)4. Three decades later, land was even more unequally 
distributed than before. By 1984, according to the Second National Agricultural Census, 3.9 percent of all farm units 
were over 100 hectares in size and occupied 91 percent of all farm surface surveyed. 
 
TABLE 1 
Bolivia: Distribution of farm units by size  







 of Farms 
In % 
 of Total Cumulative %  Hectares 
Cumulative 
Hectares 
In % of 
Total  Cumulative % 
0 to 0.5  58,319  58,319  18.5  18.5  290  290  0.0  0.0 
0.5 to 1  26,969  85,288  8.6  27.1  26,071  26,361  0.1  0.1 
1 to 2  50,970  136,258  16.2  43.3  65,460  91,821  0.3  0.4 
2 to 5  78,179  214,437  24.9  68.2  231,553  323,374  1.0  1.4 
5 to 10  37,100  251,537  11.8  80.0  243,699  567,073  1.1  2.5 
10 to 20  20,778  272,315  6.6  86.6  272,586  839,659  1.2  3.7 
20 to 50  18,622  290,937  5.9  92.5  551,363  1,391,022  2.4  6.1 
50 to 100  11,503  302,440  3.7  96.1  661,656  2,052,677  2.9  9.1 
100 to 500  6,300  308,740  2.0  98.1  1,266,486  3,319,164  5.6  14.6 
500 to 1,000  1,876  310,616  0.6  98.7  1,191,552  4,510,716  5.3  19.9 
1,000 to 2,500  1,997  312,613  0.6  99.4  3,101,277  7,611,993  13.7  33.6 
2,500 to 5,000  1,301  313,914  0.4  99.8  4,010,350  11,622,343  17.7  51.3 
Over 5,000  686  314,600  0.2  100.0  11,047,809  22,670,152  48.7  100.0 
Total  314,600          22,670,152         
Source: World Bank (1995), Pacheco (1998) and UDAPE (2006). 
 
The 1984 Census has, therefore, been used in research on land tenure in Bolivia for the last two decades, for 
example World Bank 1995, UDAPE 2006, Pacheco 19985. Table 1 shows the distribution of land by farm units 
from less than 0.5 hectare to 5000 hectares.6 
                                                 
3 The 1984 National Agricultural Census (II Censo Nacional Agropecuario) was the second of its kind in Bolivia and because it was 
done during a period of political and economic turmoil, it could not fully cover the departments of La Paz and Oruro.  The first 
agricultural census was carried out in 1950 (INE, 2005).  The current government has approved the Third National Agricultural 
Census, to be carried out in two stages between 2008 and 2009 (see, for example, Agencia Boliviana de Información. 14 May 
2008. “Gobierno autoriza realización de tercer censo agropecuario en dos etapas,” 28 July 2008: 
<http://abi.bo/index.php?i=noticias_texto_paleta&j=20080514195501&k>).  
4 Morales, Rolando, Erwin Galoppo, Luis Carlos Jemio, María Carmen Choque, Natacha Morales (2000), “Bolivia: Geografía y 
Desarrollo Económico”, Inter-American Development Bank: Washington, DC. 
5 World Bank (1995), “Staff Appraisal Report. Bolivia. National Land Administration Project”, Report No. 13560-BO, World 
Bank: Washington, DC; Pacheco Balanza, Diego (1998), “Bolivia: Modelos de desarrollo y cambios en la sociedad rural y sector The Distribution of Bolivia's Most Important Natural Resources • 3 
 
It can be seen that Bolivia's land ownership is enormously concentrated. Just 686 farm units, or 0.22 percent of the 
total landowners, have a majority of the land area. These are farms of more than 5,000 hectares, with an average size 
of more than 16,000 hectares, and some estates in the hundreds of thousands of hectares. If we include the next 
rung of the ownership ladder, farms over 2,500 hectares, the combination of these 1,300 farms plus the previous 686 
amounts to just 0.63 percent of the total. But, these farms account for more than 66 percent of all agricultural land. 
 
At the other end of the spectrum, 86 percent of farms account for just 2.4 percent of agricultural land; and, of 
course, there are many rural families without any land.  
 
The concentration of land in Bolivia among a very small group of landowners appears to be almost the worst in the 
entire world with the exception of Chile. The top part of Table 2 shows the concentration of ownership among the 
largest landholders in various countries in the western hemisphere for which data are available. In this data set, 
Bolivia's concentration of 66.4 percent of agricultural land among just 0.63 percent of landholders stands out.7 For 
comparison, the rest of the table includes countries from Africa and Asia. As can be seen, the distribution of land is 
considerably more concentrated in Latin American than in these regions. 
 
TABLE 2 
Concentration of Landholdings, Selected Countries 
Region / Country  Census Year  % of Total Landholdings  % of Total Area
Western Hemisphere      
Argentina  2002  0.94  35.93
Brazil  1996  1.02  45.10
Chile  2007  0.89  75.05
Colombia  2001  0.58  19.85
Dominica  1995  0.70  28.01
Ecuador  1999/2000  0.78  29.08
El Salvador  1987  1.11  29.26
French Guiana  1989  2.43  51.39
Grenada  1995  0.81  36.85
Guadeloupe  1989  0.90  25.64
Guatemala  2003  1.86  56.59
Honduras  1992  1.52  27.23
Jamaica  1996  0.76  53.52
Martinique  1989  1.44  43.63
Nicaragua  2000  0.80  19.80
Panama  1990  0.84  37.33
Paraguay  1991  1.05  77.08
Peru  1994  0.80  68.07
Puerto Rico  2002  2.76  40.81
(Continued, next page)
                                                                                                                                                                      
agropecuario”, Fundación Tierra: Bolivia; Unidad de Análisis de Políticas Sociales y Económicas (2006), “Sector Agropecuario 
Bolivia, 1990-2004”, UDAPE: La Paz. 
6 One hectare = 2.47 acres or 10,000 square meters 
7 Data is reported according to the size of landholdings, so it is not possible to compare, e.g., the top 0.63 percent of 
landholders in Bolivia with the same percentage in other countries. The numbers in this table represent the closest that can be 
found for the purposes of comparison at the top of the distribution.  n this table, it can be seen that Paraguay's concentration of 
land is also very high and appears as though it could be worse than Bolivia's; however, in Bolivia the top 1.86 percent of 
landowners holds 85.4 percent of land, as compared to 85.7 percent of land belonging to 2.69 percent of landholders in 
Paraguay.  Center for Economic and Policy Research, July 2008 • 4  
 
(TABLE 2, continued) 
Region / Country  Census Year  % of Total Landholdings  % of Total Area
Saint Lucia  1996  1.17  34.15
St. Vincent & the Grenadines  2000  0.93  25.71
Trinidad & Tobago  2004  3.95  55.90
United States  2002  3.66  52.42
Uruguay  2000  1.96  32.03
Venezuela  1996/1997  0.99  46.45
Bolivia  1984  0.63  66.42
Africa     
Algeria  2001  1.91  22.72
Burkina Faso   1993  5.40  19.50
Congo, Dem. Rep. Of   1990  2.87  14.02
Cote d'Ivoire   2001  2.90  25.17
Egypt   1999/2000  1.46  29.30
Ethiopia   2001/2002  1.00  6.93
Guinea  2000/2001  1.56  11.98
Morocco  1996  0.74  15.40
Namibia  1996/1997  0.97  5.58
Reunion  1989  1.28  29.21
Senegal  1998/1999  1.39  8.60
Tunisia  1994/1995  0.89  25.08
Uganda  1991  3.52  30.21
Asia      
Bangladesh  1996  0.84  10.80
Cyprus  1994  1.89  29.18
Georgia  2003/2004  1.59  40.30
India  1995/1997  1.21  14.79
Indonesia  1993  1.37  11.84
Iran  2003  0.78  19.65
Japan  1995  1.05  22.45
Jordan  1997  0.67  24.19
Korea, Republic of  1990  2.48  11.52
Kyrgyz Republic  2002  0.73  54.44
Lebanon  1998  1.61  30.41
Myanmar  2003  4.72  22.80
Nepal  2002  0.75  7.31
Pakistan  2000  1.62  21.17
Phillipines  2002  2.08  21.32
Qatar  2000/2001  2.22  54.60
Thailand  1993  1.27  12.14
Turkey  2001  0.71  11.35
Sources: FAO, World Census of Agriculture; and Table 1 (above) for Bolivia. 
 
With this extreme concentration of landholdings, the high incidence of rural poverty, and a population that still has 
a high percentage of rural population and agricultural employment, it is understandable that land reform has been a 
priority for the voters, social movements, and the national government that is accountable to them. However, as 
would be expected with such concentrated land ownership, there are powerful interests opposed to land reform. The Distribution of Bolivia's Most Important Natural Resources • 5 
 
While there are no comparable detailed data on the distribution of land by prefecture, it is clear that much of the 
concentration of large landholdings is in Santa Cruz. Santa Cruz is the largest prefecture in terms of land mass, 
population, and GDP, with 24.5 percent of the population and 28.2 percent of the country's GDP. (See Table 4 
below).  It is, therefore, the leader of the Media Luna group of provincial governments opposed to the national 
government. 
 
In 2005, the Bolivian Ministry of Farmer and Agricultural Affairs estimated that 37 percent of farm units were 
located in the Altiplano region (mainly La Paz, Oruro and Potosí) and covered 6 percent of cultivated land; 46 
percent of farm units in the Valleys region (Cochabamba, Chuquisaca and Tarija), covering 17 percent of cultivated 
land; and 17 percent of farm units in the Llanos region (Santa Cruz, Beni and Pando), covering 77 percent of 
cultivated land (IFAD, 2005: p. 4). It is clear that the large landowners of these Media Luna provinces, especially 
Santa Cruz, account for most of the concentration of land ownership and have the most at stake in opposing any 
land reform. (Tarija, the fourth Media Luna province, holds 60 per cent of the country's natural gas reserves – see 
below). Some of the most important leaders of the opposition in Santa Cruz are large landowners. For example, 
Branco  Marinkovic,  president  of  the  Pro-Santa  Cruz  Civic  Committee  (the  powerful  opposition  business  civic 
association in Santa Cruz), is reportedly one of the largest landowners in that department, with some 12,000 hectares 
(30,000 acres) of land.8 The government has found that 14 families of opposition politicians and businessmen own 
around 313,000 hectares of land in Santa Cruz and Beni.9 
 
There is another reason that the large landowners and agricultural interests have reason to fear a central government 
that might want to exert more control over land use policies. Bolivia currently imports and heavily subsidizes diesel 
fuel, which is used by the large farmers in the Media Luna provinces and especially Santa Cruz. The cost of the 
government's diesel subsidy in 2007 was about $335 million, and of course is running at a much higher rate this year 
as diesel prices have increased. This is quite a large subsidy, about 2.5 percent of Bolivia's GDP and 6 percent of the 
federal budget. The amount that goes to Santa Cruz is $135 million, or 40 percent of the total; although, not all of 
this is for agriculture. But agriculture accounts for about 15 percent of the GDP of Santa Cruz, and the subsidized 
diesel also contributes significantly to lowering the transport costs for grain produced in landlocked Bolivia, which 
has notoriously high transport costs (see Table 3, below). 
 
The  main  economic  argument  against  land  redistribution  is  that  the  large  farm  units  are  more  efficient  and 
productive than smaller ones. However, with subsidies of this size to the largest agricultural units in Santa Cruz, this 
economic  argument  is  undermined.  Furthermore,  even  with  the  current  level of diesel subsidies, the large soy 
producers do not appear to be competitive on world markets, and they therefore export to the protected markets of 
the Andean Community (see Table 3). In April of this year, the Finance Ministry announced that an inter-ministerial 
commission had been formed to evaluate the possibility of eliminating the diesel subsidy.10  Thus, large landowners, 
especially in Santa Cruz, may have a direct interest in the more extreme forms of autonomy – not only to prevent 
land reform directly, but to ensure that the provincial government would continue to subsidize their production 
even if these subsidies were found, on economic grounds, to be wasteful, inefficient, and/or regressive in terms of  
                                                 
8 BBC News World. 14 September 2006. “Struggle for land in Bolivia”. British Broadcasting Network. 28 July 2008. 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/5303280.stm>.  Other sources suggest Marinkovic’s family owns some 27,000 
hectares of land that were acquired illegally and are in dispute: Inter-Press Service.  27 December 2007. “BOLIVIA:  Guarayo 
Indians Struggle to Hold Onto Their Land”. 28 July 2008. <http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=40615>; Bolpress. 17 
September 2007. “Reforma Agraria alista la reversión de tierras de Branco Marinkovic”. 28 July 2008. 
<http://bolpress.de/art.php?Cod=2007091733>.  Marinkovic also held shares in the recently nationalized gas transportation 
company, Transredes.  
9 Bolpress. 23 November 2006. “14 familias detentan 312.966 hectáreas de tierra en Santa Cruz y Beni”. 28 July 2008. 
<http://www.bolpress.com/art.php?Cod=2006112314>; Bolpress. 17 November 2006. “Terratenientes forman un frente de 
defensa del latifundio”. 28 July 2008. <http://www.bolpress.com/art.php?Cod=2006111714>.  
10 La Prensa. April 16 2008. “El gobierno estudia eliminar subsidio a más de 700.000 litros de diesel que consume a diario el agro 
cruceño”. 28 July 2008. <http://www.laprensa.com.bo/noticias/16-04-08/16_04_08_ultimas_eco14.php>.   Center for Economic and Policy Research, July 2008 • 6  
 
TABLE 3 
Cost comparison in soybean production 
   Direct production costs  Administration and transportation costs  Total 
   US$/ha  Yield (metric tons)  US$/m.t.  US$/m.t.  US$/m.t. 
Argentina  183.4  3.4  53.9  49.8  103.7 
Bolivia  182.0  2.1  86.7  79.0  165.7 
Brazil  267.0  2.7  98.9  23.1  122.0 
U.S.  221.0  2.4  92.1  18.0  110.1 
Source: Kreidler et al (2004).
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income redistribution. It might be possible to maintain these subsidies in spite of the central government's decisions, 
for  example,  if  the  provincial  government  could  get  control  over  revenues  that  now  accrue  to  the  central 
government. 
 
The "Media Luna" and Other Provinces: Economic and Demographic Characteristics 
 
Before  focusing  on  the  issue  of  the  distribution  of  hydrocarbons  revenue,  it  is worth looking at some of the 
economic and demographic differences between the provinces.  
 
As can be seen in Figure 1 (next page), the Media Luna provinces – Santa Cruz, Tarija, Beni, and Pando, have a much 
lower indigenous population than the rest of the country, ranging from 16.2 percent in Pando to 37.5 percent in 
Santa Cruz; this compares with 66 to 84 percent in the other five provinces. This is clearly a vast demographic gap in 
a country where the indigenous majority has suffered centuries of discrimination. Indigenous Bolivians today have 
much  higher  rates  of  poverty,  extreme  poverty, illiteracy, and malnutrition. For example, non-indigenous labor 
income is about 2.2 times that of indigenous labor income; and non-indigenous Bolivians have an average of 9.6 
years of schooling versus 5.9 for indigenous Bolivians (World Bank, 2005).   
 
Table  4  shows  the  population  of  the  provinces,  the  percent of indigenous population, per capita income, and 
poverty rate. In the Media Luna group, Santa Cruz predominates, with more than 2.5 million people – compared 
with less than half that for the other three states combined. The state accounts for 33.7 percent of Bolivia's territory 
and  28.2  percent  of  its  GDP.  As  noted  above,  Santa  Cruz,  Beni,  and  Pando  (three  of  the  four  Media  Luna 
provinces) have large landholders who own the vast majority of Bolivia's agricultural land. Pando has only 72,428 
people and has very poor ground transportation. 
 
Tarija, the fourth Media Luna province, has just 4.9 percent of Bolivia's population but 85 percent of the country's 
natural gas reserves. Table 5 shows natural gas production by province. Tarija leads with 60 percent of the country's 
production.  Santa  Cruz  is  second  with  22.3 percent. Thus, more than 82 percent of natural gas production is 
concentrated in these two Media Luna states. 
 
In Table 4, it can be seen that the Media Luna states as a group also have a much higher per capita income than the 
other provinces. This is also shown in Figure 2. In 2007, the Media Luna provinces had a per capita income about 
1.4 times the other provinces:  $1,698.58, as compared to $1,175.28. 
                                                 
11 Kreidler, A., Rodríguez, G., Rocha, A., Antelo, E. (2004), “La soya boliviana hacia el mercado libre en las Américas”, 
USAID/Bolivia, Economic Opportunities Office, cited in Patricia Molina and Sorka Copa (2005), “¿La agricultura soyera en 




Map of Bolivia with indigenous population by department (in percent of total population), and hydrocarbon 
revenues per capita (in $US). 
 
Sources: INE, UDAPE 
 





   Population /1  Indigenous 
population /2 






TOTAL  9,827.5 62.0  1,363.0 58.6  100.0
           
Chuquisaca  621.4 65.6  957.5 70.1  4.4
La  Paz  2,715.0 77.5  1,212.2 66.3  24.6
Cochabamba  1,747.9 74.4  1,217.8 54.9  15.9
Oruro  440.7 73.9  1,511.6 67.8  5.0
Potosí  776.6 83.9  933.9 79.7  5.4
Tarija  484.2 19.7  3,529.0 50.8  12.8
Santa Cruz  2,546.9 37.5  1,484.1 38.1  28.2
Beni  422.4 32.8  877.3 76.1  2.8
Pando  72.4 16.2  1,791.8 72.5  1.0
Sources: INE, UDAPE.  
Notes: 
1/ Estimates for 2007 from UDAPE. In thousands. 
2/ From INE (2001 Census). In percent of the total population in each department. 
3/ In 2007, from INE. In US$. 
4/ Most recent data available by departments (INE, 2001 Census). Headcount poverty ratio for each department. 





Bolivia: Gas Output 
   Gas Output (2006) 
   (millions of cubic feet)  (% of total) 
TOTAL  518,733  100.0 
     
Chuquisaca  30,071  5.8 
La Paz  -  - 
Cochabamba  61,417  11.8 
Oruro  -  - 
Potosí  -  - 
Tarija  311,429  60.0 
Santa Cruz  115,816  22.3 
Beni  -  - 
Pando  -  - 
Source: INE. 
 The Distribution of Bolivia's Most Important Natural Resources • 9 
 
FIGURE 2 














































































Tarija was the richest by far, with a per capita income of $3,529.0, 137.8 percent higher than the Media Luna leader 
Santa Cruz. The poorest Media Luna state was Beni, with a per capita income of $877.3.  
 
Hydrocarbon Revenues 
Table 6 shows the distribution of hydrocarbon revenues by province, on a per capita basis. There was a vast increase 
in  hydrocarbon  revenue  from  2004  to  2007.  This  was  a  result  of  the  2005  hydrocarbons  law  and  the  re-
nationalization in 2006, which greatly increased the government's take, and also the general increase in energy prices. 
The result was an increase of $1.3 billion dollars, or about 10 percent of GDP, from 2004-2007. In Table 6, this is 
shown on a per capita basis, from $31.1 to $160.2 dollars per capita, a more than five-fold increase in three years. 
 
As can be seen from the table, all provinces gained from this increase, although with vast disparities. Pando, which 
does not produce any of the gas, leads with $751 per capita – although with only 72.4 thousand people, it does not 
take a large share of the revenue. Tarija, which produces 60 percent of the gas, is second with $491 per capita. This 
is still more than 18 times the per capita revenue of La Paz ($27), which has two-thirds of its population below the 
poverty line. Beni, another Media Luna state, is next with $148 per capita. Santa Cruz, the leader of the Media Luna, 
does not do particularly well with $46 per capita, although it is the second largest producer. But the Media Luna 
states as a group have the lion's share of the hydrocarbon revenue:  30 percent, as compared to 19.7 percent for the 
other five states (whose combined population is 79 percent greater than the Media Luna). This is shown in Table 7, 
which shows the distribution of total hydrocarbon revenue by province. Center for Economic and Policy Research, July 2008 • 10  
 
TABLE 6 
Bolivia: Hydrocarbon revenues per capita /1 
   Revenues per capita 
  (US$ per capita) 
  2004  2007 
Chuquisaca  7.8  93.4 
La Paz  0.0  27.0 
Cochabamba  18.0  49.6 
Oruro  0.0  104.7 
Potosí  0.0  59.4 
Tarija  148.0  491.1 
Santa Cruz  12.5  46.4 
Beni  19.6  147.7 
Pando  61.3  751.3 
Total Royalties and 
IDH Bolivia /2  31.1  160.2 
Source: Ministerio de Hidrocarburos y Energía; INE. 
Notes: 
1/ Data for 2007 are projections by the Hydrocarbons and Energy Ministry. 
2/ Includes royalties and IDH revenues of the central government and the departments. 
 
Perhaps even more striking than the distribution of hydrocarbon revenue between the provinces is the relatively 
small amount that goes to the central government. As can be seen in Table 7, only about 25 percent of total 
hydrocarbon  revenue  accrues  to  the  national  government.  Another  25.2  percent  accrues  to  the  national 
hydrocarbons company (YPFB). About half, or 49.7 percent, goes to the prefectures, municipalities, and universities.  
 
The details regarding current collection and distribution of hydrocarbon revenues are explained in the Appendix. 
 
Of all the oil and gas producers in the world, where hydrocarbons are a sizeable share of national income and/or 
export  earnings,  there  is  probably  no  country  where  sub-national  governments  get  such  a  large  share  of  the 
hydrocarbon revenue. In most developing countries, it is assumed that these valuable resources belong to the nation 
as a whole, not to the particular region in which happens to be underground. This is especially important for 
developing countries, since their development strategy – the means by which they can eliminate extreme poverty and 
reduce overall poverty – is based on using the rents from their mineral wealth to diversify away from hydrocarbons, 
as well as investing in economic and social infrastructure. Of course, this is even more important in a time of high 
energy prices. The Media Luna states are advocating in another direction: in a country that already distributes its 
hydrocarbon revenues more than any in the world to provincial and local governments, they want even more to go 
to the provincial governments. This would make it more difficult for the government to pursue an overall economic 
development strategy. The Distribution of Bolivia's Most Important Natural Resources • 11 
 
TABLE 7 
Bolivia: Distribution of hydrocarbon revenues by different levels of national government 
   2004  2005  2006  2007 /1 
  (In US$ millions) 
Chuquisaca  4.6  16.9  51.0  58.1 
Prefecture: Royalties and IDH  4.6 14.2 32.6  38.2
Municipalities and Universities: IDH  0.0 2.7 18.4  19.9
La Paz  0.0  20.3  61.1  73.3 
Prefecture: Royalties and IDH  0.0 14.1 24.3  26.2
Municipalities and Universities: IDH  0.0 6.2 36.8  47.1
Cochabamba  29.4  40.5  80.5  86.7 
Prefecture: Royalties and IDH  29.4 36.2 54.5  56.3
Municipalities and Universities: IDH  0.0 4.3 26.0  30.4
Oruro  0.0  18.1  42.8  46.1 
Prefecture: Royalties and IDH  0.0 14.1 24.3  26.2
Municipalities and Universities: IDH  0.0 4.0 18.5  19.9
Potosí  0.0  18.1  42.8  46.1 
Prefecture: Royalties and IDH  0.0 14.1 24.3  26.2
Municipalities and Universities: IDH  0.0 4.0 18.5  19.9
Tarija  66.0  137.9  218.5  237.3 
Prefecture: Royalties and IDH  66.0 132.6 194.9  210.7
Municipalities and Universities: IDH  0.0 5.3 23.6  26.6
Santa Cruz  28.9  44.4  96.8  117.9 
Prefecture: Royalties and IDH  28.9 38.6 63.1  76.8
Municipalities and Universities: IDH  0.0 5.8 33.7  41.1
Beni  7.8  29.0  57.4  62.4 
Prefecture: Royalties and IDH  7.8 25.0 38.9  42.5
Municipalities and Universities: IDH  0.0 4.0 18.5  19.9
Pando  3.9  23.6  50.1  54.2 
Prefecture: Royalties and IDH  3.9 19.6 31.6  34.3
Municipalities and Universities: IDH  0.0 4.0 18.5  19.9
Total Departments  140.6  348.8  701.0  782.1 
Prefectures  140.6 308.5 488.5  537.4
Municipalities and Universities  0.0 40.3 212.5  244.7
              
Central Government  147.0  259.2  377.8  394.0 
YPFB  0.0  0.0  220.4  395.9 
Total Bolivia  287.6  608.0  1,299.2  1,572.0 
Sources: Ministerio de Hidrocarburos y Energía. 
Notes:  




This paper has examined Bolivia's two most important natural resources – land and hydrocarbons – in the context 
of a political conflict between several provincial governments and the national government. While there are many 
factors that play a role in this conflict – including race and ethnicity, centralism versus federalism and local control, 
the conflict over where the nation's capital should be located – it is clear that the distribution of Bolivia's land and 
hydrocarbon  revenue  occupies  an  important  and  possibly  central  role  in  the  dispute.  While  there  is  room  for 
compromise and give-and-take on many issues with regard to autonomy and the powers of provincial and local 
governments, it may be difficult or impossible for the government to deliver on its promises without significantly 
altering the distribution of land. Also, to cede even more control over hydrocarbons resources to the provincial 
governments, where it is already very unequally distributed, would make governing even more difficult. 
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Appendix: Current Collection and Distribution of Hydrocarbons Revenues 
 
Hydrocarbon revenues in Bolivia can be divided into two main groups.  The first group refers to those revenues 
collected at the production stage and currently include royalties and the Direct Tax on Hydrocarbons (Impuesto 
Directo  a  los  Hidrocarburos  –  IDH).    The  second  group  refers  to  direct  and  indirect  taxes  collected  during  the 
distribution, refining and marketing stages. Some of these taxes apply to all companies operating in the country 
(whether foreign or national), such as sales and income taxes, and other taxes apply only to the hydrocarbons sector 
(Velásquez-Donaldson, 2007)12.  Of these taxes levied specifically on the hydrocarbons sector, the most significant 
one in terms of revenue generation is the Special Tax on Hydrocarbons and Derived Products (Impuesto Especial a los 
Hidrocarburos y sus Derivados – IEHD), applied to the sale of hydrocarbon products, whether national or imported, in 
the domestic market. 
 
At present, the structure of royalty payments on hydrocarbon production is based on the 2005 Hydrocarbons Law 
and the 2006 Nationalization Decree (Supreme Decree No. 28701).  The basis for royalty and IDH (explained 
below) payments is the net hydrocarbon production, which consists of the volume of hydrocarbons produced every 
month, net of any oil or gas used in the operation of the field.  
 
Where a private company operates the field, the net hydrocarbon production is transferred from the company to the 
national hydrocarbons company, YPFB (Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales Bolivianos), which is in charge of administering 
the  process  of  transporting  and  selling  the  hydrocarbons.    YPFB  then  makes  the  payments  to  the  national 
government for patents, royalties and the IDH.  It then pays the operating company for its recovery costs, and 
shares the rest based on a formula establishing YPFB’s share.  This formula depends, among other things, on the 
volume produced by the field, the amounts invested and some taxes paid by the firm (Vargas 2007; YPFB 2006). 
 
The distribution of royalties disproportionately benefits the departments that produce hydrocarbons, which receive a 
royalty  of  11  percent  of  the  total  production  in  that  department.  Additionally, the law establishes a National 
Compensatory Royalty of 1 percent of the national hydrocarbon production for the departments of Beni and Pando, 
each receiving 2/3 and 1/3 of this royalty, respectively.  Finally, the central government (through the National 
Treasury) receives a royalty of 6 percent of the total national production. 
 
In addition to royalties, YPFB pays a 32 percent Direct Tax on Hydrocarbons (IDH) on each field’s production. 
This  is  then  distributed  at  different  levels  among  the  departments,  municipalities,  universities,  the  central 
government  and  some  special  funds.  The funds generated by this tax have specific spending guidelines at the 
different levels but in general, they must be used for education, health, security and employment promotion.13  
 
At the broadest level, the total IDH revenues are distributed between the departments and the central government: 
12.5 percent goes to the producing departments (each department getting a share according to its hydrocarbon 
production); 31.25 percent goes to the non-producing departments (6.25 percent each) and the rest (56.25 percent) 
goes to the National Treasury (central government).  However, if a producing department receives a lower amount 
of  revenues  than  the  non-producing  departments,  the  National  Treasury  must  compensate  the  producing 
department so that it receives the same amount of revenues as the non-producing departments.  
 
At the departmental level, the IDH revenues are distributed among the prefecture (the departmental government), 
the municipalities (the department’s subdivisions or districts) and the department’s public university or universities. 
The municipalities receive 34.48 percent of the department’s total IDH revenues and each municipality’s share 
depends on its share of the department’s total population. The department’s public university obtains 8.62 percent 
of these revenues; if there is more than one public university in the department, this percentage is distributed 
according  to  an  agreement  between  the  universities,  the  Finance  and  Education  ministries  and  the  Executive 
Committee of Bolivian Universities.  Finally, the rest (56.9 percent) is allocated to the department’s prefecture. 
 
                                                 
12 Christian Velásquez-Donaldson (2007), “Analysis of the Hydrocarbon Sector in Bolivia: How are the Gas and Oil Revenues 
Distributed?”, Institute for Advanced Development Studies, Development Research Working Paper Series No. 6/2007. 
13 The distribution of IDH revenues is ruled by Supreme Decree No. 28421 (October 21, 2005). Center for Economic and Policy Research, July 2008 • 14  
 
After compensating producing departments as indicated above, the central government must also pay for certain 
allocations that reduce its share of total IDH revenues.  The first of these mandated allocations (5 percent of total 
IDH revenues) is distributed among the municipalities and universities of the three most populous departments: La 
Paz (46.19 percent), Santa Cruz (36.02 percent) and Cochabamba (17.79 percent).  In each of these departments, 80 
percent is allocated to the municipalities (according to their share of the department’s total population) and 20 
percent to the public university or universities. 
 
The central government must also pay for another 5 percent of total IDH revenues allocated to a Development 
Fund for Indigenous Peoples and Peasant Communities.  These resources are meant to fund projects created by 
indigenous organizations, which are then implemented by the prefectures and municipal governments.  
 
A similar allocation (5 percent of total IDH revenues) is made for another fund meant to foster the mass use of 
natural gas in Bolivia.   
 
Finally, the central government must also make certain allocations to the army and the national police. There are no 
specific percentages assigned to these institutions and instead, they must be made through specific programs and 
projects in each institution’s budget. Therefore, it is unclear what impact these allocations have on the central 
government’s final share of IDH revenues. 
 
The above relationships and distribution of revenues are diagrammed in Figure 3. 
Given this distribution and according to data from the Hydrocarbons Ministry (see above), all hydrocarbon revenues 
generated through royalties and the IDH in 2007 amounted to $1.572 billion, of which 25 percent accrued to the 
central government (through the National Treasury).  Most of these revenues went to the different prefectures, 
municipalities and universities (49.7 percent) and another 25.2 percent went to the national hydrocarbons company 
(YPFB).  
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FIGURE 3 
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